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ABSTRACT

This Article analyzes the impact of TRIPS on the
pharmaceutical industry in India, an industry that has
traditionally taken a 'free-ride" on the technological
developments of other nations. The authors discuss the
patent system in India prior to TRIPS and India's long-term
refusal to join the Paris Convention regarding intellectual
property.
In the past, India had limited protectionfor technology.
Some areas-food,pharmaceuticals, and products made by
TRIPS
processes-received no patent protection at all.
changed this system and also changed the compulsory
licensing and license of right provisions that limited patent
protection in India.
The authors argue that all
people-scientists in India and abroad, as well as Indian
consumers-will eventually benefit from the new system so
long as India subsidizes drug costs for the very poorest
consumers.
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I. INTRODUCTION

A few years ago, one of the authors wrote an article about the
resurgence of patent law in the United States.' The article
discussed how the creation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit exemplified the renewed interest in and even respect for
Essentially this
the patent system in the United States.
resurgence is part of the resurgence of capitalism in the United
States, for a strong patent system corrects a serious defect in the
heart of free market systems: the ability of competitors in certain
market structures to free-ride on the work of innovators. Patent
systems correct this defect by providing for protection against
2
free-riding in all kinds of market structures.

This respect for capitalism and free markets reverses a trend
in the U.S. regulatory climate. During the post-World-War-Il
period, as the United States moved away from free markets,

antitrust assumed the stature of a civil religion. Antitrust was
not only good, but more antitrust was better. Many believed that
free markets were so inherently defective that there was a need
for a steady increase in broad scale intervention under the banner
Martin J. Adelman, The New World of Patents Created by the Court of
1.
Appealsfor the Federal Circuit,20 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 979 (1987).
2.
Martin J. Adelman, The Supreme Court, Market Structure, and
Innovation: Chakrabarty,Rohm and Haas, 27 ANTITRUST BULL. 457, 461-66 (1982)
[hereinafter Adelman, The Supreme Court].
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known as antitrust. There certainly was no need to strengthen
the patent system, a monopoly-granting system.
Indeed, in
perhaps the most detailed modem review of the literature relating
to patent systems (authored by Professor Fritz Machlup of Johns
Hopkins University in the late 1950s), 3 Professor Machlup
summed up in an oft quoted statement:
If we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on
the basis of our present knowledge of its economic consequences,
to recommend instituting one.
But since we have had a patent
system for a long time, it would be irresponsible, on
the basis of
4
our present knowledge, to recommend abolishing it.

The post-WWII period was not the first time that the patent
system was under attack, 5 nor will it likely be the last. In the
future, tides may sweep across the world both for and against free
markets. It is clear, however, that economists contribute to antipatent sentiment by arguing that patent systems are inefficient.
They note that many industries have other incentives to
encourage innovation and argue that this fact makes the patent
system unnecessary. The existence of industry incentives is of
course irrelevant to efficiency because a principal purpose of any
patent system is to make industrial structure essentially
irrelevant to the innovation process. Thus, industries can adopt

efficient industrial structures without being affected to any
considerable degree by the need to encourage innovation.
Mathematicians would assert that incentives to innovate under
an effective patent system are essentially invariant over differing

industrial structures.
A second error often made by economists is the charge that
patent systems encourage wasteful attempts to invent around
patents. This argument overlooks the fact that if inventing
around occurs that does not lead to a superior product, it is the
result of a bargaining failure between the patentee and the second
inventor. The patentee should have granted a license to the
second inventor under those circumstances, a transaction that
would have benefited both the patentee and the second inventor.
Bargaining failures, of course, occur in all property rights
systems. They are not an appropriate basis for an attack on a

3.
STAFF OF SENATE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHTS,
SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., 2D SESS., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF
THE PATENT SYSTEM (Conli. Print 1958).

4.
Id. at80.
5.
See Fritz Machlup & Edith Penrose, The Patent Controversy in the
Nineteenth Century, 10 J. ECON. HIST. 1 (1950).
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particular property rights system unless that system is uniquely
prone to such failures. While the foregoing is self-evident, these
mistakes are nevertheless made repeatedly in the economics
literature, even by economists of the caliber of Professor
Machlup. 6 Such mistakes led in part to the incredible conclusion
quoted above and form the basis of many attacks on patent
systems.
During the life of any patent, products covered by a product
patent will be more costly than they would have been in the
absence of the patent. Otherwise, the patent would have no
market effect. The monopoly profits generated by the patent
benefit the patent owner, although in reality all of the economic
value created by the patented technology cannot be captured by
the patent owner while the patent is alive. Plainly, however, the
patent system does not simply generate winners, it also generates
losers: those who pay monopoly prices for products that for one
reason or another would have been invented in the absence of a

patent system. Yet, even these losers may also be winners, since
they also benefit from products that are off-patent, but which may
not have been developed in the absence of a patent system.
Therefore, there may not be many losers; indeed, there may not
7
be any losers at all.
Of course, since patents are territorial, some countries may
decide that they can win by free-riding on the patented technology
developed elsewhere without substantially slowing the march of
technological development.
In this way, their societies are
advantaged, although if everybody adopted this strategy, societies
worldwide would lose out as technological advancement slowed.
Moreover, this strategy is more likely to be followed in the more
socialized areas of a country's economy. Thus, many countries
have in the past adopted weak patent protection for
pharmaceuticals, 8 an industry whose structure makes it
particularly dependent on the existence of a patent system. They
let the rest of the world, particularly the wealthy Western
countries, pay the cost of the development of new drugs and hope
that the failure to participate will not stunt so many drugs'
development that the strategy backfires. One surprising former

6.
See Adeiman, The Supreme Court,supra note 2. at 457-66.
7.
The special arguments relating to the role of patent systems In
developing countries are reviewed in George Y. Gonzalez. An Analysis of the Legal
Implications of the Intellectual Property Provisionsof the North American Free Trade
Agreement, 34 HARV. INT'L L. J. 305, 310-13 (1993) (citing articles).
8.
See Gerald J. Mossinghoff. Research-BasedPharmaceuticalCompanies:
The Needfor Improved PatentProtectionWorldwide. 2 J.L. & TECH. 307 (1987).
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member of this club is Canada. 9

India is one of the most

important current members. Indeed, India is a good example of
what can happen when a large percentage of the world's
population decides to go its own way, and part of its strategy is to
place the cost of developing new drugs on others.
The free-riding strategy has another flaw. To the extent that
a particular country has special needs that are not as acutely felt
in the wealthy West, technological development that affects such
needs will not take place. Thus, that country will pay a stiff price
for the absence of an effective patent system. This is plainly the
case with respect to pharmaceuticals for certain diseases such as
malaria and leprosy, which are a far greater problem in countries
like India than in the West.
II. THE TRIPS ERA BEGINS
As everyone in the intellectual property field is aware, over

100 countries have now agreed, through the Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), not to
free-ride on the inventive efforts of others. The importance of
With respect to
TRIPS cannot be easily overemphasized.' 0
patents, TRIPS requires that all signatory countries put in place
an effective patent system for essentially all branches of
technology." It also requires that patents must live for at least

Id. at 320-21. See also Kate H. Murashige, Harmonization of Patent
9.
Laws, 16 Hous. J. INT'L L. 591 (1994).
10.
Professor J. H. Reichman of Vanderbilt University School of Law has
recognized this importance for many years in his many significant writings on the
subject. He recently wrote a comprehensive analysis of TRIPS for the International
Lawyer. See J. H. Reichman. UniversalMinimum Standards of IntellectualProperty
Protection Under the TRIPS Component of the WTO Agreement, 29 INT'L LAW. 345,
345-46 n.3 (1995) (also contains a list of Reichman's writings on the subject).
See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
11.
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994 [hereinafter Final Act], reprinted in
THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS-THE

LEGAL TEXTS 2-3 (GATT Secretariat ed., 1994) [hereinafter RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND]; Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr.
15, 1994 [hereinafter WTO Agreement], Apr. 15, 1994, Annex 1C: Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights [hereinafter TRIPS
Agreement], reprinted In RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND. supra, at 6-19, 365-403.
For U.S. congressional approval, see Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No.
103-465, §§ 101-103, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) [hereinafter URAA] (authorizing the
President to accept the Uruguay Round Agreements and implement the WTO
Agreement, but denying treaty status and domestic legal effect to the Uruguay
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twenty years from the filing date.' 2 Patent rights are clearly
defined,1 3 and remedies for infringement include the availability
Round Agreements as such, and excluding private actions
agreements).
Article 27 entitled "Patentable Subject Matter" reads:

under

those

1.
Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3 below,
patents shall be available for any inventions, whether products or
processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve
an inventive step and are capable of industrial application. Subject to
paragraph 4 of Article 65, paragraph 8 of Article 70 and paragraph 3 of
this Article, patents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without
discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of technology and
whether products are imported or locally produced.
2.
Members may exclude from patentability Inventions, the
prevention within their territory of the commercial exploitation of which is
necessary to protect ordrepublic or morality, including to protect human,
animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the
environment, provided that such exclusion is not made merely because
the exploitation is prohibited by domestic law.
3.
Members may also exclude from patentability:
(a)
diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for
the treatment of humans or animals;
(b)
plants and animals other than microorganisms,
and essentially biological processes for the production of plants or
animals other than non-biological and microbiological processes.
However, Members shall provide for the protection of plant varieties
either by patents or by an effective sui generis system or by any
combination thereof. The provisions of this sub-paragraph shall be
reviewed four years after the entry into force of the Agreement
Establishing the MTO.
TRIPS, supra,art. 27.

12.

Article 33 entitled "Term of Protection" reads: "The term of protection

available shall not end before the expiration of a period of twenty years counted
from the filing date." TRIPS, supranote 11, art. 33 (footnote omitted).
13.
Article 28 entitled "Rights Conferred" reads:
1.

A patent shall confer on its owner the following exclusive

rights:
(a)
where the subject matter of a patent is a product,
to prevent third parties not having [the owner's] consent from the acts of:
making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes
that product;
(b)
where the subject matter of a patent is a process.
to prevent third parties not having [the owner's] consent from the act of
using the process, and from the acts of: using, offering for sale, selling, or
Importing for these purposes at least the product obtained directly by that
process.
2.
Patent owners shall also have the right to assign, or
transfer by succession, the patent and to conclude licensing contracts.
Id. art. 28 (footnote omitted).
However, there are exceptions to the rights required by Article 28. They are
set forth in Article 30 entitled "Exceptions to Rights Conferred." which reads:
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of damages' 4 and injunctive relief. 15 A shifting of the burden of
proof also makes process patents more readily enforced than
under a regime that follows the ordinary rules on burden of
proof.' 6 Moreover, TRIPS requires each signatory country to put

Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights
conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably
conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably
prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account of
the legitimate interests of third parties.
Id. art. 30.
14.
Article 45 entitled "Damages" reads:
The judicial authorities shall have the authority to order
1.
the infringer to pay the right holder damages adequate to compensate for
the injury the right holder has suffered because of an infringement of [the
right holder's] intellectual property right by an infringer who knew or had
reasonable grounds to know that he [or she] was engaged in infringing
activity.
The judicial authorities shall also have the authority to
2.
order the infringer to pay the right holder expenses, which may include
appropriate attorney's fees. In appropriate cases, Members may authorize
the judicial authorities to order recovery of profits and/or payment of
pre-established damages even where the infringer did not know or had no
reasonable grounds to know that he [or she] was engaged in infringing
activity.
Id. art. 45.
Article 44 entitled "Injunctions" reads:
15.
The judicial authorities shall have the authority to order a
1.
party to desist from an infringement. Inter alia to prevent the entry into the
channels of commerce in their jurisdiction of imported goods that involve
the infringement of an intellectual property right, immediately after
customs clearance of such goods. Members are not obliged to accord such
authority in respect of protected subject matter acquired or ordered by a
person prior to knowing or having reasonable grounds to know that
dealing in such subject matter would entail the infringement of an
intellectual property right.
Notwithstanding the other provisions of this Part and
2.
provided that the provisions of Part II specifically addressing use by
governments, or by third parties authorized by a government, without the
authorization of the right holder are complied with, Members may limit the
remedies available against such use to payment of remuneration in
accordance with sub-paragraph (h) of Article 31 above. In other cases, the
remedies under this Part shall apply or, where these remedies are'
inconsistent with national law, declaratory judgments and adequate
compensation shall be available.
Id. art. 44.
Article 34 entitled "Process Patents: Burden of Proof" reads:
16.
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in place a reasonably dffective enforcement mechanism for
patents 1 7 and to comply with Articles 1-12 and 19 of the Paris
18
Convention.
Important issues raised by TRIPS, including restrictions on
the patentee's exclusive rights, limitations on compulsory
licensing, and questions relating to biotechnology and computer
programs will not be discussed in detail here. 19 However, given
the strong patent system required by the TRIPS provisions, it is
important to study the ability of a signatory country to install a
compulsory licensing system that effectively eliminates or gravely
weakens its patent system. For example, a system could be
envisioned that allows for drug patents, but that also provides
that any third-party can obtain a license for a royalty rate of four
percent, effectively destroying the value of the patent granted in
compliance with the other TRIPS-inspired provisions.
There is a modest limit on the use or abuse of such a system
in the Paris Convention. Article 5(A) of the Paris Convention
reads in part as follows:
(2)
Each country of the Union shall have the right to
take legislative measures providing for the grant of compulsory
licenses to prevent the abuses which might result from the exercise

1.
For the purposes of civil proceedings in respect of the
infringement of the rights of the owner referred to in paragraph l(b) of
Article 28 above, if the subject matter of a patent is a process for obtaining

a product, the judicial authorities shall have the authority to order the
defendant to prove that the process to obtain an Identical product is
different from the patented process. Therefore, Members shall provide, in
at least one of the following circumstances, that any Identical product
when produced without the consent of the patent owner shall, in the
absence of proof to the contrary, be deemed to have been obtained by the
patented process:
(a)
if the product obtained by the patented process is new;
(b)
if there is a substantial likelihood that the identical
product was made by the process and the owner of the patent has been
unable through reasonable efforts to determine the process actually used.
2.
Any Member shall be free to provide that the burden of
proof indicated in paragraph 1 shall be on the alleged infringer only if the
condition referred to in sub-paragraph (a) is fulfilled or only if the
condition referred to in sub-paragraph (b) is fulfilled.
3.
In the adduction of proof to the contrary, the legitimate
interests of the defendant in protecting [the defendant's] manufacturing
and business secrets shall be taken into account.
Id. art. 34.
17.
See Id. arts. 41-43.
18.
See id. art. 2; Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 25 Stat. 1372, T.S. No. 379 [hereinafter Paris
Convention].
19.
These issues are carefully analyzed by Professor Reichman. and there
is no need to repeat his analysis here. See Reichman, supra note 10.
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of the exclusive rights conferred by the patent, for example, failure
to work.

(4)
A compulsory license may not be applied for on the
ground of failure to work or insufficient working before the
expiration of a period of four years from the date of filing of the
patent application or three years from the date of the grant of the
patent, whichever period expires last; it shall be refused if the

patentee justifies his [or her] inaction by legitimate reasons. Such a
compulsory license shall be non-exclusive and shall not be
transferable, even in the form of the grant of a sub-license, except
with that
part of the enterprise or goodwill which exploits such
20
license.

This provision of the Paris Convention provides that effective
patent protection cannot be removed by a compulsory licensing
system until at least three years from the grant 2 1-a very short
period of effective protection for a patentee.
Article 31, entitled "Other Use Without Authorization of the
Right Holder," goes considerably further in controlling abuses of
compulsory licensing. 2 2
While this provision would allow a

20.
Paris Convention, supra note 18, art. 5(a).
21.
For a detailed analysis by Fredrik Neumeyer of the world's compulsory
licensing provisions as they existed in the late 1950s, see STAFF OF SENATE
SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHTS,

SENATE COMM.

ON THE

JUDIcIARY, 85TH CONG., 2D SESS., COMPULSORY LICENSING OF PATENTS UNDER SOME

NON-AMERIcAN SYSTEMS (Comm. Print 1959). For a more recent review, see Cole
M. Fauver, Compulsory PatentLicensing In the United States: An Idea Whose Time
Has Come, 8 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BuS. 666 (1988).
22.
Where the law of a Member allows for other use of the subject
matter of a patent without the authorization of the right holder, including
use by the government or third parties authorized by the government, the
following provisions shall be respected:
(a)
authorization of such use shall be considered on its
individual merits;
(b)
such use may only be permitted if,
prior to such use, the

proposed user has made efforts to obtain authorization from the right
holder on reasonable commercial terms and conditions and that such
efforts have not been successful within a reasonable period of time. This
requirement may be waived by a Member in the case of a national
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public
non-commercial use. In situations of national emergency or other
circumstances of extreme urgency, the right holder shall, nevertheless, be
notified as soon as reasonably practicable.
In the case of public
non-commercial use, where the government or contractor, without making
a patent search, knows or has demonstrable grounds to know that a valid
patent is or will be used by or for the government, the right holder shall be
informed promptly;
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country determined to weaken its patent system to attempt to do
so through the mechanism of compulsory licensing, TRIPS makes
such deliberate weakening more difficult than It is under the
Paris Convention. Indeed, the requirements of Article 31 are

sufficiently onerous that its effect may well be to sharply curtail
the abuse of compulsory licensing in the world today. Note also

(c)
the scope and duration of such use shall be limited to the
purpose for which it was authorized, and in the case of semi-conductor
technology shall only be for public non-commercial use or to remedy a
practice determined after judicial or administrative process to be
anti-competitive.
(d)
such use shall be non-exclusive;
(e)
such use shall be non-assignable, except with that part of
the enterprise or goodwill which enjoys such use;
any such use shall be authorized predominantly for the
(f)
supply of the domestic market of the Member authorizing such use;
(g)
authorization for such use shall be liable, subject to
adequate protection of the legitimate interests of the persons so
authorized, to be terminated if and when the circumstances which led to it
cease to exist and are unlikely to recur. The competent authority shall
have the authority to review, upon motivated request, the continued
existence of these circumstances;
(h)
the right holder shall be paid adequate remuneration in
the circumstances of each case, taking into account the economic value of
the authorization;
(i)
the legal validity of any decision relating to the
authorization of such use shall be subject to judicial review or other
independent review by a distinct higher authority in that Member;
any decision relating to the remuneration provided in
(j)
respect of such use shall be subject to judicial review or other
independent review by a distinct higher authority in that Member;
(k)
Members are not obliged to apply the conditions set forth
in sub-paragraphs (b) and (f) above where such use is permitted to remedy
a practice determined after judicial or administrative process to be
anti-competitive. The need to correct anti-competitive practices may be

taken into account in determining the amount of remuneration In such
cases.
Competent authorities shall have the authority to refuse
termination of authorization if and when the conditions which led to such
authorization are likely to recur;
(I)
where such use is authorized to permit the exploitation of
a patent ("the second patent") which cannot be exploited without infringing
another patent ("the first patent"), the following additional conditions shall
apply:
(i)
the invention claimed in the second patent shall
involve an important technical advance of considerable economic
significance in relation to the invention claimed in the first patent;
(ii)
the owner of the first patent shall be entitled to a
cross-licence on reasonable terms to use the invention claimed in the
second patent; and
(iii)
the use authorized in respect of the first patent
shall be non-assignable except with the assignment of the second patent.
TRIPS, supra note 11, art. 31 (footnote omitted).
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that Article 2723 precludes the claim that satisfying the market
demand through imports can be used as a basis for compulsory

licensing where satisfying it in the same way through domestic
manufacture would not be.
TRIPS also does not have a provision regarding infringement.
There is little to prevent a country from deliberately weakening its

patent system by providing that claims are to be limited by the
24
use of the specification, as Japan has done for many years.
Moreover, TRIPS permits a member nation to have a pre-grant

opposition procedure, which presents the potential for abuse in
that it can unreasonably delay the issuance of a patent. Finally,
25
TRIPS did not tackle the question of patent exhaustion.
Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that any patent system that
fairly complies with TRIPS will be an effective patent system
applicable throughout a wide area of technology.
In the short run, of course, TRIPS will result in the enrichment of the innovating community, because that community is
structured to make money in an environment where many freeride on their efforts. In the long run, the world community will
benefit, because there will be more inventive activity leading to
more innovation than there would have been in the absence of
TRIPS. An interesting, but probably unanswerable, question is
the extent to which TRIPS is a result of the worldwide resurgence
of capitalism (and, therefore, a symptom rather than a root cause
of the strengthening of the world's patent systems). It may well
be that the function of TRIPS is to provide political cover for politicians to do what they know is right for their countries, but it is
subject to demagoguery by opposition politicians. It may also be
that TRIPS resulted from the pressure that those who have

suffered serious free-riding placed on their governments.

Then

again, TRIPS may be the result of all of these disparate forces. In
any event, the dramatic effect of TRIPS, or whatever forces are

behind it, may be shown by studying one important patent

system that will be revolutionized by compliance with TRIPS, the
patent system of India, and the effect of TRIPS on the
pharmaceutical industry in particular. However, in order to

23.

See supra note 11.

24.
See TOSHIKO TAKENAKA, INTERPRETING
STATES. GERMANY AND JAPAN 193-286 (1995).

PATENT CLAIMS:

THE

UNITED

25.
The current general rule that the sale by the patentee in a third
country does not exhaust the patent right is treated in depth in Hanns Ullrich,
TRIPS: Adequate Protection,InadequateTrade, Adequate Competition Policy. 4 PAC.
RIM L. & POL. J. 153, 158-61 (1995).
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properly understand the extent of the revolution, it is helpful6 to
2
review the major provisions of the current patent law in India.

III. INDIAN PATENT ACT OF 1970
India enacted its first act relating to patent rights in India in
1856. It granted exclusive privileges to inventors of new products
for a period of fourteen years. 2 7 It was renewed in 1859 with
revisions founded on the British Patent Act of 1852.28
Subsequently, the Indian Patents and Design Act of 191129
replaced all previous legislation. This act was the governing
legislation when India gained independence in 1947.
After
independence, the Indian government felt that the Indian laws,
framed under British rule, required basic changes to bring them
in line with the aspirations of an independent country with a
rapidly transforming, dynamic, industrial economy. The Indian
Government appointed two committees (the Tek Chand
Committee in 1948 and the Ayyangar Committee in 1957) to
review the Indian patent system with a view toward ensuring that
the system comported with national interests.
The committees found that between eighty and ninety percent
of the Indian patents were held by foreigners and more than
ninety percent of them were not worked in India.3 0
The
committees asserted that the system was being exploited by
foreigners to achieve monopolistic control over the market. In
regard
to vital
industries like
food,
chemicals,
and
pharmaceuticals, the data for patents was similar for the period
1947 through 1957. Medicines were arguably unaffordable to the
general populace, and the drug-price index was rising.

These reports led to an extensive debate in the Indian
Parliament that finally resulted in the 1970 enactment of the
Patents Act (the Act).3 1 It is, with some important exceptions, a

26.
See generally Suresh Koshy, The Effect of TRIPS on Indian Patent Law:
A PharmaceuticalIndustry Perspective, 1 B.U. J. Sci. & TECHN. L. 4 (1995); LeNhung McLeland & J. Herbert O'Toole, Patent Systems In Less Developed
Countries: The Cases of India and the Andean Pact Countries, 2 J. L. & TECH. 229
(1987).
27.
See B. K. Keayla, PatentProtection and the PharmaceuticalIndustry, In
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 151 (K.R.G. Nair & Ashok Kumar eds., 1994)
[hereinafter INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS].
28.
15 & 16 Vict., ch. 83 (Eng.).
29.
Indian Patents and Design Act, act 2 (1911) reprinted in P. NARAYANAN,
PATENT LAW 1032-71 (2d ed. 1985).
30.
See Keayla, supra note 27, at 152.
31.
The Patents Act, 1970, No. 39 (1970) (India) [hereinafter Patents Act).
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However, the
copy of the English Patent Act of 1949.32
modifications were critical to creating a system that was far
weaker than the corresponding English patent law of the era.
Any appraisal of Indian patent law should begin with the
principal objectives it attempts to achieve, as articulated in
Section 83:
(a)
The patents are granted to encourage inventions and to
secure that the inventions are worked in India on a commercial

scale and to the fullest extent that is reasonably practicable
without undue delay; and
(b)

to
That they are not granted merely to enable patentees
33

enjoy a monopoly for the importation of the patented article.

The considerations that are said to be the quid pro quo for the
grant of a patent monopoly are:
(i)
Working of the invention within the country so as to result
in the establishment of new industry and employment of labor and

capital in the country.
Disclosure to the public of the invention so that on the
(it)
life of the patent, the public is enabled to work the
expiry of 3the
4
invention.

The public interest is given priority over the private interest of the
inventor by providing:
(1)
Government the right to use a patented invention in
particular circumstances.
compulsory
(2)
Remedies for abuse of patent rights (e.g.,
3 5
licenses, licenses of right, and revocation of patents).

This language suggests that India not only sought to encourage
innovation but also to encourage the working of patents in India.
However, the policy of encouraging local working does not explain
why India chose to severely weaken its patent system.
The question of patentable subject matter was handled in a
conventional manner. Accordingly, a patent may be obtained only
for an invention that is new and capable of industrial
application.3 6 It must relate to a machine, article, substance
produced by manufacture, or process of the manufacture of an
article.3 7 One may also obtain a patent for an improvement of an

32.
33.

Patents Act, 1949, 12-14 Geo. 6, ch. 87 (Eng.).
Patents Act, supra note 31, §§ 83(a), (b).

34.

PARAMES\VARAN NARAYANAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 10 (1990).

35.

Patent Act, supra note 31, §§ 47, 83, 89 and 86.

36.
37.

Id. § 2(j).
Id.
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However, the discovery

of a scientific abstract theory,3 9 or the discovery of a new property

or use for a known substance or machine, cannot be patented,
unless it results in a new reactant. 40 In addition, inventions that
are contrary to law and morality, injurious to public health, 4 1 or
those related to methods of agriculture or horticulture 4 2 cannot
be patented. Any process for the treatment of human beings or
43
animals falls outside the ambit of patentable subject-matter.
Similarly, inventions related to atomic energy are not
patentable.44 While not unusual in 1970, the Indian law does not
protect food, medicines, drugs, or any substance produced by a
chemical process. However, process claims covering methods of
45
their manufacture are patentable.
IV.

INDIAN PATENT PRACTICE

The procedure for filing a patent application and obtaining a
patent is fairly simple but involves lengthy delays. The average
time span for a patent application examination is between two
and five years. There are a total of four patent offices in India,
with roughly forty-five examiners. The average annual number of
applications is 3000, out of which about 1000 are domestic
46
filings.
India, which is not a member of the Paris Convention, Is a
"first-to-file" country. India, however, does have a system of
domestic priority. To be property fied, an application for a patent
should be filed in the patent office in the prescribed form, along
with the prescribed fee. 4 7

The application should consist of a

If a provisional
provisional or complete specification. 48
specification is filed, the complete specification should be
submitted within twelve to fifteen months from the date of filing
the first application. 4 9 The provisional and complete specification

38.

Id.

39.
40.

Id. § 3(c).
Id. § 3(d).

41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. § 3(b).
Id. § 3(h).
Id. § 3(1).
Id. §4.

45.
46.

Id. §§ 5(a), (b).

CONTROLLER GENERAL OF PATENTS.
ANNUAL REPORT ON PATENTS 26 (1992-93).

47.

Patents Act, supra note 31, § 7(1).

48.
49.

Id. § 7(4).
Id. §9(1).

DESIGNS AND TRADEMARKS,

21st
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practice found in Indian law mirrored the practice of England at
the time and for many years previously.
Each application should contain claims to a single
invention. 50 The examination begins with the question of whether
the claimed invention falls within the ambit of patentable
subject-matter and is new and useful. The examiner looks for
prior art by searching in publications available in the Patent
51
Office and specifications of previous applications and patents.
Such searches are not exhaustive or final.
The complete specification is the basis of the Indian patent
system.
Its claims define the boundaries of the patentee's

property rights. The complete specification should fully describe

52
the invention and the method by which it is to be carried out
and disclose the best mode of performing the invention known to
the applicant. 5 3
Specifications should be accompanied by
drawings whenever necessary.5 4 Claims should be based on the
matter disclosed in the specification.
Lack of novelty is a ground for the refusal of an application.
An application can also be refused if the claimed invention has
been published, claimed by any other person, or publicly used or
known in India.5 5 There is no grace period and no provision for
examination as to obviousness. However, obviousness is a basis
for opposing an application.
All patent applications are examined for compliance with the
procedural requirements of the Act, 5 6 and whether there is any
lawful ground of objection to the grant. 57 After the examination,
the patent examiner makes a report to the Controller of Patents
(Controller) of the objections, if any, to the grant. 5 8
These
objections might relate to the drafting of the specification and
59
claims or anticipation of any claims against such specification.
These objections may be communicated to the applicant, giving
the applicant an opportunity to amend its specification. 60 If they
are not satisfactorily removed, or if it appears to the Controller

50.
51.

Id. § 10(5).
Id. § 13.

52.

Id. § 10(4)(a).

53.

Id. § 10(4)(b).

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§§ 10(2) and (3).
§§ 29-34.
§ 12(i)(a).
§ 12(1)(b).
§ 12(2).
§ 13.
§ 15(1)(b).
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that the claimed invention is not patentable 6 ' or is contrary to the
law,62 the Controller may refuse the application. If the applicant
satisfactorily removes the objections, the Controller may accept
6 3
the complete specification and publish it in the Official Gazette.
Thereafter, any person may give notice of opposition within four
months from the date of publication.64 The grounds for
opposition, as set forth in Section 25, are unremarkable. 65

If there is an opposition, the Controller notifies the applicant,
who then must reply to the notice of opposition within one month.
Thereafter, the parties may file their evidence, and the matter will
be heard and decided. 6 6 Where the application is accepted, either
a
without the resolution of an opposition or after opposition,
67
patent will be granted if the applicant requests sealing.
Infringement of a patent is governed by the claims in
accordance with English precedent. 68 The defenses in
infringement suits are similar to those listed as the grounds for
opposition. The burden of proof for establishing infringement is
on the plaintiff.6 9 In

cases where the patentee's rights are

infringed, the patentee is entitled to an injunction and, at the
patentee's option,70 either damages or an accounting of the
infringer's profits.
India is not a signatory to the Paris Convention, 7 1 apparently
because India's basic philosophy (the working of the patent) is not

61.
62.
63.
64.

65.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§
§
§
§

15(2).
15(3).
23.
25(1).

The grounds for opposition are:
1.
2.

obtaining invention wrongfully;
prior publication in any Indian specification or prior publication in

3.
4.

any other document in India or elsewhere;
prior claim in a concurrent application;
prior public use or public knowledge in India;

5.

obviousness and lack of inventive step;

6.

invention not patentable under the Act;

7.

insufficient description of invention:

8.
9.

failure to disclose information relating to foreign applications;
in case of a convention application, not made within the prescribed

time.
Id.
66.

Patents Act, supra note 31. § 25(2).

67.

Id. §§ 43(1](a). (b).

68.

PARAMESWARAN NARAYANAN. PATENT LAW 492-509 (2d ed. 1985).

69.
70.
71.

Id. at 550.
Patents Act, supra note 31. § 108.
Paris Convention, supra note 18.
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in harmony with the Convention's principles. 7 2 In addition, Indian
citizens have to obtain prior permission from the Controller to
apply for patents outside India. 73
Under the principle of
reciprocity, only those countries that give Indian citizens similar
rights or privileges as are granted to its own citizens with respect
to the grant of patents and protection of patent rights are
declared "Convention countries" by the government of India. 7 4 If
a person who has made a basic application for a patent in a
Convention country makes an application for the same patent in
India within twelve months, the applicant will be entitled to the
75
priority date for claims in India.
Up to this point, other than India's refusal to join the Paris
Convention, its law is unremarkable. As of 1970, India's basic
period of patent life, fourteen years from the filing of the complete
specification, was two years shorter than that provided by English
patent law and six years shorter than the current international
standard. 78 However, not all inventions enjoy the usual period of
protection. The term for inventions involving the method or
process of the manufacture of a substance to be used as a food,

medicine, or drug is five years from the date of sealing7 7 or seven
years from the filing date of the complete specification, whichever
is shorter. 78 Thus, it is possible that a patent which is opposed
will expire before the opposition is concluded.
Hence, for
processes that come within this special definition, patent
protection is plainly minimal. Other aspects of India's patent law,
however, are even weaker.

72.
N. R. Madhava Menon, The Dunkel Draft and Intellectual Property
Rights, In INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS. supra note 27, at 65, 69.
73.
Patents Act, supra note 31, § 39.
74.
Pravin Anand, The Intellectual Property Jurisdiction in India. in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 50, 58 (Sangal & Ponuswami eds., 1994).
75.
Id.
76.
Patents Act, supra note 31, § 53(l)(b). This section references all
periods defining the life of the patent from the "date of the patent." The "date of
the patent" is defined in § 45 as the filing date of the complete specification.
77.
As explained earlier, sealing occurs in response to a request for a grant
of a patent after all examination and opposition procedures, if any, are
terminated.
78.
Id. §§ 53(1)(a), 45.
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V. INDIA'S COMPULSORY LICENSE AND LICENSE OF RIGHT REGIMES

The Patents Act mandates the local working of Indian
patents. 7 9 The Controller grants compulsory licenses of patents
when the patent rights have not been commercially exploited by
the patentee or available to the public in India at a reasonable
price.8 0 The object of compulsory licensing is to ensure that the
inventions are worked in India on a commercial scale for the
benefit of the public. However, the requirement of a reasonable
price puts the value of all patents in the hands of the Controller,
even those worked in India. An application to the Controller for
the grant of a compulsory license can be made by any person
three years after sealing. 8 '
A patent may be endorsed with the words "License of right"
after three years from sealing if the reasonable public
requirements with respect to the patented invention have not

been satisfied or if the invention is not available to the public at a
reasonable cost. 8 2 All patents on processes for making food and
medicine are endorsed with these words three years from
sealing. 83 Under this provision, the Controller has capped the
royalties at four percent of the total wholesale cost of a
84
shipment.
Even worse, Indian law provides that if the reasonable
requirements of the public with respect to the patented invention
remain unsatisfied, the patent may be revoked by the Controller
on non-working grounds.8 5 These provisions have been applied
ten to fifteen times in the past two decades. Thus, even in those
areas of technology where India allows patenting, the patents are
only effective for a period of three years from sealing.

VI. PATENT PROTECTION FOR PHARMACEUTICALS
While technology generally receives some protection under
the Indian patent system, such protection is limited primarily by
compulsory licensing and licenses of right. Food, medicines,

79.
Id. § 83(a).
80.
Id. § 84(l).
81.
Id.
82.
Id. § 86(l). Cases where "reasonable public requirements are deemed
not satisfied" are defined In § 90 of the Act. Id. § 90.
83.
Id. § 87(1)(a).
84.
See Koshy, supra note 26, at 4 n.52 (citing HEINZ REDWOOD, NEW
HORIZONS IN INDIA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT PROTECTION 17

(1994)).
85.

Patents Act, supra note 31, § 89.
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drugs, as well as products made by processes, do not receive any
patent protection. For example, there currently is no system for
protecting pharmaceuticals in India. The question then is: what
is the state of the pharmaceutical industry in India, under a
regime where the government has excluded it from the country's
patent system and has attempted to protect it by building a tariff
wall around India? A brief look at this industry is in order,
because it is apparent that TRIPS revolutionizes Indian patent law
with respect to this industry. While TRIPS will effectively change
the compulsory licensing and license of right provisions as well as
the patent term for the industry generally, the major effect comes
with respect to the industries that have received special

treatment, such as the pharmaceutical industry. To measure the
change that is coming, it is helpful to look briefly at India's
pharmaceutical industry.

VII. INDIAN PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY-PAST AND PRESENT

Of all the Indian corporate sectors that have seen growth
since the independence of India from the British rule in 1947, the
The
pharmaceutical sector is probably the most dramatic.
pharmaceutical industry has grown at a rapid pace, from around
one hundred million rupees in 1947, to seventy billion rupees
today, with exports exceeding twenty billion rupees. 86 At the time
of independence, the output of one hundred million rupees
basically consisted of the processing and compounding of
imported drugs for making formulations. 8 7 Today, Indian
manufacturers of bulk drugs and formulations not only dominate
the Indian market but are among the most fiercely competitive in
the*world. Indian companies compete in the international race to
exploit the huge market for generic drugs that is developing in the
West. Indian industry has emerged as a world leader in the
as
Ciprofloxacin,
such
drugs
of
bulk
production
Norfloxacin,
Ibuprofen,
Ethambutol,
Dextropropoxyphene,
8
Sulphamethoxazole, and Trimenthoprim. 8
India has become a net exporter of drugs and has earned a
considerable reputation in the international market as a

86.
S.L. Rao, The Indian Health Care Industry: Role of Intellectual Property
Rights, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 27, at 165, 166.
Keayla, supra note 27, at 151, 155.
87.
Id. at 156.
88.
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dependable bulk drug manufacturer.
The bulk drug
manufacturers are being courted by multinationals for
partnerships involving manufacture, marketing, and even joint
research. Companies like Ranbaxy, Dr. Reddy's Laboratories,
Cipla, and Lupin have the potential to become billion dollar
companies by the year 2000.89 This tremendous growth during
the past four decades has resulted from the comprehensive
shielding of the industry against foreign competition by regulatory
controls, high tariffs, foreign equity restrictions, price controls,
and little or no patent protection.
In the early 1940s and 1950s, ninety percent of the drug
market was under the control of foreign companies, and the
country was totally dependent on imports for both bulk drugs (the
active ingredients) and formulations (the medicines made from
bulk drugs). As a result, Indian drug prices were then among the
highest in the world. To counter this problem, policyrnakers
erected a protectionist regime. The underlying objective of this
regime was self-reliance through an indigenous industry that
could break the foreign companies' stranglehold on both the
availability and the prices of drugs. The government framed the
Drug Price Control Order (DPCO) to shield consumers against
high prices. All drugs were divided into four categories: (1) life
saving (i.e., drugs required for the National Health
Program-drugs used to treat malaria, tuberculosis, and leprosy),
(2) essential, (3) less-essential, and (4) non-essential. Ceilings
were fixed on the retail prices of drugs in the first three
categories, which effectively set a limit on the maximum amount
of profit companies could make from their manufacture. This
graded system of price control was aimed at making life-saving
and essential drugs affordable. Price and production control
mechanisms were put in place to ensure the production of
essential drugs. The important drugs were reserved for the public
sector.
At the same time, to encourage domestic industry, new drugs
(many of them on-patent internationally) manufactured through
indigenous technologies were exempted from price controls for five
years. Additionally, formulations using novel delivery systems
developed in India were exempted for three years. Foreign
companies in India were more interested in producing
non-essential drugs that required low technological inputs. These
companies acted as trading centers that imported drugs from
their parent companies abroad. Little attempt was made to start

89.

Shivanand Kanavi, Leadersin Technology, Bus. INDIA, July 1994, at 52,
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production facilities in India, and the foreign sector did not bring
in any new technology.
India's patent law was another instrument of public policy
that decidedly shifted the balance in favor of domestic
manufacturers. Indian companies could access the latest drugs
all over the world, re-engineer them through new processes, and
sell them in the domestic market.
This resulted in the
development of valuable process-engineering skills. Moreover,
due to high tariff rates (as much as eighty to ninety percent on
bulk drugs and intermediates), the Indian sector was forced to
develop a complete manufacturing capability. It was only a
matter of time before these companies became extremely cost
efficient producers of bulk drugs and formulations, effectively
marginalizing the foreign companies. Further, the price control
mechanisms stymied the growth and profitability of foreign
companies; the government-set price did not even equal their
conversion costs or their raw material costs. By contrast, Indian
companies were exempted from these controls for the newest
drugs for five years. Thus, foreign companies lost out to low-cost
domestic competitors.
It is estimated that the capital costs of setting up a
pharmaceutical plant in India is about one-third of the cost in the
West.
Indian companies had an advantage over foreign
companies that were not in a position to take advantage of India's
low manufacturing costs.
This export competitiveness was
reserved for Indian players only. The intense competition in the
domestic market channeled the pharmaceutical manufacturers
toward the export market. Over the past decade, drug exports
have been growing at thirty-five percent annually, reaching 17.8
billion rupees in 1993-94.
Today, domestic production meets seventy percent of the
bulk drug requirements and ninety percent of its formulations.
Indian companies control seventy percent of the domestic
formulations market and eighty-five percent of the bulk drugs
market.
They also account for eighty-five percent of the
industry's exports. Basic drugs are mainly exported to developed
countries, while the primary markets for finished formulations are
developing countries and the former Soviet Union. However,
given the development of this sophisticated generic drug industry
in India, the question remains: has India, in spite of its lack of an
effective patent law, contributed to the development of new drugs
to treat diseases that affect its people more than those in the
West? The answer unfortunately, but not unexpectedly, is no.
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Traditionally, scientific research in India, mainly a
government-run activity, has been conducted under a few
governmental or quasi-governmental agencies like the Atomic
Energy Commission, Indian Space Research Organization, Indian
Council for Agricultural Research, and Council of Scientific and
Industrial Research (CSIR). Out of the total capital earmarked for
scientific research, almost half Is allotted to mission-oriented
agencies, such as Space and Atomic Energy. Out of the small
percentage of capital that goes to CSIR, which is mandated to
develop and commercialize indigenous technologies in order to
avoid importing technology, more than ninety percent goes toward
the salaries of research staff, leaving very little for original
research.
In addition, there is a lack of synergy between
government research and development (R&D) and private
industry.
Today, however, pharmaceutical companies are trying to
build technology muscle. A prime example is Ranbaxy Lab, Inc.
(Ranbaxy), an $800 million market capitalized company.
Recently, the company signed a $90 million joint venture with Eli
Lilly & Co. to collaborate for drug research and development,
manufacturing, and marketing.
Ranbaxy is also purchasing a
New Jersey drug company for about $25-30 million. 9 ° These
developments reflect the influence of TRIPS and give some
indication of what may well happen to the Indian pharmaceutical
and other science-based enterprises in the next two to three
decades.

VIII. RECENT CHANGES IN SCIENCE-BASED INDUSTRIES IN INDIA
Since 1970, the pendulum has been swinging sharply toward
the domestic industry. However, this trend is reversing itself due
to the recent shift toward capitalism in India and the
prospect-now the reality-of TRIPS. Even prior to signing TRIPS,
the Indian Government adopted a new drug policy in an effort to
bring the pharmaceutical sector in line with India's liberalized
industrial policy, while ensuring that the interests of consumers
were not sacrificed. Many restrictions have been swept aside to
facilitate foreign investment in the industry. Industrial licensing
is being abolished, and the number of drugs under the DPCO is
down from 142 to 73.91 The span of control will be reduced from

90.

Sougata MukherJee, Drug Unit Eyes $30 Million Purchase, TRIANGLE

Bus. J., Apr. 21, 1995, availablein Westlaw, Allnews Database.
91.
DEPARTMENT OF CHEMICALS IN THE MINISTRY OF CHEMICALS
FERTILIZERS, GOVT. OF INDIA. DRUG POLICY, 1986 (issued on Sept. 15, 1994).
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A national pharmaceutical pricing
seventy to fifty percent.
authority (nongovernmental) will be set up with a very
transparent and responsive system of pricing, which will promptly
revise drug prices. Previously, in the absence of a liberal pricing

system, Indian companies with a four percent profit margin could
not invest heavily in R&D to match international standards,
92
which are fifteen to twenty percent of turnover.
Since 1991, foreign equity ownership of up to fifty-one
percent is permitted, and foreign companies are treated on par
with Indian drug companies. Coupled with a commitment to
protect intellectual property rights (IPRs) effectively, these steps

are clearly intended to attract investment and encourage faster
Some other concerns, including the
technology transfer.
simplification of procedures, extension of quality control
measures, and establishment of a national fund to promote
research, still need to be addressed.

IX.

THE EXPECTED IMPACT OF TRIPS ON INDIA OVER THE NEXT
DECADES

TRIPS requires India to establish, within ten years, a patent
system that will provide effective protection for new drugs and the
processes for making them. 93 Since a bias in favor of domestic

92.
India Should Change Ground Rules on Patents. MARKETLETTER, Aug. 22.
1994, available In LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
93.
Article 65 entitled "Transitional Arrangements" reads in part:
Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 below,
1.
no Member shall be obliged to apply the provisions of this Agreement
before the expiry of a general period of one year following the date of entry
into force of the Agreement Establishing the MTO.
2.
Any developing country Member is entitled to delay for a
further period of four years the date of application, as defined in
paragraph 1 above, of the provisions of this Agreement other than Articles
3, 4 and 5 of Part I.
4.
To the extent that a developing country Member is obliged
by this Agreement to extend product patent protection to areas of
technology not so protectable in its territory on the general date of
application of this Agreement for that Member, as defined in paragraph 2
above, it may delay the application of the provisions on product patents of
Section 5 of Part II of this Agreement to such areas of technology for an
additional period of five years.
TRIPS, supra note 11, art. 65.
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manufacture cannot be used in compulsory licensing proceedings,
one can expect the foreign sector to grow; however, Indian
companies that are strong in R&D will also grow. There will be
pressure on copiers who will not be able to copy the latest drugs.
Therefore, one can expect that India will develop a vigorous and
thriving R&D-based drug sector, 94 with a particular focus on new
drugs for the treatment of diseases predominant in India, such as
malaria, typhoid, and cholera.
Since the domestic market is
huge and Indians also have the same chronic and acute diseases
that plague the industrialized West, one can expect that Indian
companies will work on pharmaceuticals for these diseases as
well. Given the wealth and talent of the country, one can expect
that, within three decades, there will be Indian-based companies
that rival those based in Japan and, perhaps, even those based in

the United States, England, or Switzerland. Such changes could
create enormous wealth that would be shared by both Indians
and those living elsewhere in the world.

X.

WILL INDIAN POLITICIANS STOP THE PARTY?

The impending revolution in the pharmaceutical industry
brought about by TRIPS has generated considerable controversy.
For local drug companies, farmers, corporations, and national
sovereignty, TRIPS is a source of great disagreement and
confusion in India. Indians have simplified the whole trade
morass to Dunkel,9 5 the report that with one or two minor
exceptions became TRIPS. A growing anti-Dunkel lobby in India
has vociferously denounced TRIPS.
"Reject Dunkel, Reject
Imperialism" is familiar graffiti. Their insurmountable fears are
the following:
1. Escalation of drug prices.
2. Local sector of the drug industry will be displaced.
3. Monopoly of multinational corporations in India.
4. Imports will increase.
5. Small farmers will be wiped out, since they will have to pay
huge royalties to buy seeds from the multinational corporations.

94.
R&D spending among Indian drug firms averages 2% of turnover, as
compared with 12%-16% in the West. Under the TRIPS regime, it could double
within a few years. Indian Industry Seminar Discusses Patents, MARKETLETTER,
May 22, 1995. available in LEXIS. News Library, Curnws File.
95.
Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, GATT Doc. MTN.TNC/W/FA (Dec. 20, 1991)
(submitted by former GATT Director-General Arthur Dunkel and commonly
referred to in India as "Dunkel").
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6. Agriculture will turn into a capital intensive industry with
multinational dominance.
The first four objections relate to the pharmaceutical
industry, of which the most common fear is that, after the TRIPS
implementation, the price of all new drugs will be increased as
much as 2000-3000%. 98 Indians fear that the national drug
sector, which accounts for seventy percent of the domestic
market, will be totally devastated; that foreign companies will be
the mainstay, and no R&D will take place; and that drugs will be
imported to fulfill the working requirements of the patent, which
will result in the out-flow of foreign exchange, with no technology
assimilation in return. Another fear is that generic drug makers
will be severely affected and the exports of drugs from India will
plummet. 9 7 No longer will India's drug prices, which currently
range from five to thirty times lower than the countries with
product patents, rank among the lowest in the world. 98
These fears are overblown. First, only new drugs (i.e., those
patentable as of the effective date of the agreement) will be
affected by TRIPS. Moreover, India does not have to provide
actual patent protection for such drugs until 2006. Significantly,
such drugs will have to compete on price with unpatented drugs
and will have to be reasonably priced in order to keep the sale of
the patented drug n India profitable. Low purchasing power, in a
health care system in which only about 3.7% of the population is
covered by health insurance and around 75% of the expenditure
on medicines is borne directly by patients, will contribute to
maintaining low drug prices even for patented drugs.
Local prices depend on purchasing power and competition.
Stiff competition among multiple producers of the same drug have
made Indian drugs among the cheapest in the world. Drugs
outside the price control regulations have experienced the
The large
sharpest fall in prices due to fierce competition.
number of manufacturers with alternative processes has brought
about competition, which can be seen in the export markets. As
in the West, this type of competition will remain with respect to
off-patent drugs. Only with regard to new drugs will TRIPS
change the dynamic of drug development in favor of competition.

96.
I.A. Modi, Dunkel and Drugs:Recipefor Disaster,ECON. TIMES, Nov. 25,
1993, at 9.
Id.
97.
98.
Future Shock Awaits Indian Drug Consumers. Bus. EXPRESS, Jan. 3,
1994, at 11.
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TRIPS will disadvantage both those in India who will now
have to pay higher prices for patented drugs that would have been
developed and paid for by others in any event, and Indian
companies that specialize in exploiting the new drugs on-patent
in the West. TRIPS, however, will benefit the people of the world,
who will have more new pharmaceuticals than they otherwise
would have had (because the payments are higher to inventors of

such pharmaceuticals). There will, of course, be winners in India
as well-the inventors who develop a local industry that creates
rather than copies pharmaceuticals, as well as those who do not
have to emigrate to work in the cutting edge pharmaceutical
industry. Once India develops a viable and competitive worldclass pharmaceutical industry, then there will be more winners
than losers in India. After some period of time, even more world
citizens will be advantaged by TRIPS. The users of patented
drugs, which have no satisfactory unpatented substitutes, will
have to admit that, in the absence of a worldwide patent system,
the drug that may save their life may not have been developed.

XI. TRIPS, PATENT EXHAUSTION, AND INDIA
One area where TRIPS could, but does not play a role, is the
issue of exhaustion. A company owning a patent on an important
new drug might decide to price that pharmaceutical in India at a
price lower than that in the United States, Japan, or Europe,
because it does not believe that the Indian market would sustain
the higher price. However, if one or more developed countries
would consider that a sale in India frees that product from the
corresponding patent in the developed countries under an
exhaustion theory, then the patentee might be unwilling to
reduce its price in India. Therefore, it is in the interest of
consumers in poorer countries to have an agreement with
wealthier countries whereby sales by the patentee in the poorer
countries will not be treated as an exhaustion of patent rights in
the wealthy countries.
Fortunately for India, TRIPS preserves the current territorial

nature of the world's patent systems because of Article 6, entitled
"Exhaustion." Article 6 states: "For the purposes of dispute
settlement under this Agreement, subject to the provisions of
Articles 3 and 4 above nothing in this Agreement shall be used to
address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual property
rights." If Indian sales by the patentee exhausted the patentee's
rights in other countries, this would aid the export of the patented
drug from India and perhaps increase the number of jobs in
India. However, patentees would also charge higher prices to
On balance, a country with 900 million
Indian consumers.

1996]

TRIPS: THE CASE OFINDIA

533

people, which is a huge internal market, would be better off if
patentees would price their patented products based solely on the
Indian market. This requires that patent systems around the
world continue to refuse to treat a sale of a patented product in
India by the patentee as exhausting the patentee's rights
worldwide.

XII. CONCLUSION
Within the next decade, science-based industry in India will
be drastically restructured by TRIPS. The winners will include
the talented class in India, who will not have to emigrate to
contribute to the advancement both of themselves and of society
at large. The winners will also be those who suffer from diseases
that are endemic in countries such as India, as well as citizens in
the rest of the world, who will benefit in the long run from the
huge talents of the Indian people. The losers, if there are any, will
be those who pay more for drugs that would have been developed
in any event. Most of them are wealthy, some beyond the dreams
of avarice, and can well afford the extra cost. There may also be a
few losers who will be unable to obtain a necessary drug for which
there is no satisfactory unpatented substitute. For those citizens,
Indian society should provide a subsidy. A subsidy to those few
citizens would be a small price to pay for the enormous benefits
brought both to India and the world by TRIPS.

